ALAWI
VS ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sale
representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. of Davao City. Ashari
Alauya is the incumber executive of clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. It appears that through Alawi's
agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of
one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter,
simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was
also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC). Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company.
Ruling:
1. As
regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has
already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
2.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
IN RE GARCIA
Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his
verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born
in Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he
had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato
Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the
"Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of
Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as
"Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to practice
the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on
Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law
profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations.
Rulings:
1. The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish
State cannot be invoked by applicant. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring
to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to
the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to
Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
2. Article I of the Treaty are made expressly subject to the laws and
regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to
exercise the legal profession which have the force of law, and Section 1 of
Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, require that before
anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must first
successfully pass the required bar examinations; and
3. The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the
laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon
the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter
or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the
Philippines.
DE LEON VS MONTESA
Facts:
Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig,
this Court, in its decision dated January 22, 2001, ruled that private
respondent Jacob F. Montesa's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel — CESO IV
of the Ministry of Local Government was temporary for failure to possess the
required Career Executive Service (CES) eligibility for the said position.
Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to
security of tenure. Thus, private respondent filed the instant motion for
reconsideration by invoking res judicata. He contended that his
appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the present case
considering that the said issue had already been settled in the Minute
Resolution of this Court dated March 17, 1992 in Jacob Montesa v. Santos,
et al., when his appointment was first contested.
Ruling:
1. A reading . . . of the
Integrated Reorganization Plan which was adopted and declared part of the law
of the land by Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, clearly
shows that a CES eligibility is indeed a requirement for a position embraced in
the CES.
2. [I]n March 1974, the CES
Board issued CESB Circular No. 1 which laid down the requirements for
membership in the CES [.] . . . The foregoing law and circular were never
amended nor repealed by the Freedom Constitution. A CES eligibility was an
existing and operative requirement at the time of private respondent's
appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel — CESO IV. Neither were the said law and
circular inconsistent with the Freedom Constitution as to render them modified
or superseded.
3. Hence, assuming ex
gratia argumenti that a CES eligibility is not a requirement in the
case of private respondent, the mobility and flexibility concepts in the
assignment of personnel in the CES, which allow transfer or reassignment of CES
personnel to other positions of the same rank or salary, justify his transfer
to other CES position without violating his right to security of tenure.
IN
RE EDILLON
Facts:
Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, constitute questions the
all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation
to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of
the Court Rule 139-A) an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that
he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this
matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an
administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.
Ruling:
1. WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of
the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
of the Court.
2. An "Integrated
Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary.
3. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a
privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an
officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest,
the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has created. The expression
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power."
4. The Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 6397, approved on
September 17, 1971, authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of
the State.
DIAO VS MARTINEZ
Facts:
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having
falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had
the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to
the Solicitor-General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he
submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of
attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination
in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law
subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of
Private Education
Ruling:
1. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing such examination is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential.
ROYONG VS OBLENA
Facts:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959,
complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of
the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner
described therein.
Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is,
and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good
moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation,
or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the
roll of Attorneys.
IN RE LANUEVO
Facts:
Disbarment proceedings were filed against the Bar Confidant,
Victorio Lanuevo and a 1971 bar candidate, Ramon Galang, and disciplinary
action against five bar examiners for acts and omissions committed in the 1971
bar examinations.
Based on a confidential letter from a bar flunked, The Supreme
Court checked the records of the 1971 bar examinations. As a result thereof,
the grades in five subjects of an examinee (Ramon Galang) were found to be
charged, which, however, were the properly initialed and authenticated by each
of the examiner concerned. Upon investigation, the Bar Confidant admitted in
his sworn statement having brought back the five examination notebooks to the
examiners for re-evaluation. In turn, the five examiners admitted, in their
individual sworn statements, having re-evaluated and re-checked the notebooks
involved (all of which had failing marks) upon the representation made to each
of them separately and individually by the Bar Confidant that examiners were
authorized to do so and that the examinee concerned failed only in his
(examiner concerned) particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing. On the other hand, Ramon Galang denied any knowledge of the
actuation's of the Bar Confidant.
The Supreme Court, holding that the Office of the Bar Confidant
has absolutely nothing to do with the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the
grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after the
notebooks are submitted by the examiners and, that, therefore, the deception
made by the Bar Confidant was in violation of the trust and confidence reposed
in him, disbarred the Bar Confidant and ordered his name stricken from the roll
of attorneys.
With respect to respondent Ramon Galang, the Supreme Court likewise
disbarred him because of the highly irregular manner of his passing the bar
which was effected through an authorized re-evaluation of his examination
notebooks, and on the ground that he fraudulently concealed and withheld his
pending criminal case for slight physical injuries in all his seven
applications to take the bar examinations which indicates his lack of the
requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor.
Respondent Bar Examiners were reminded to exercise the greatest or
utmost care and vigilance in the performance of their duties as such.
LIM VS ANTONIO
Facts:
In a verified letter dated October 20, 1968 addressed to this
Court complainant Vicente L. Lim prayed for the disbarment of the respondent,
Francisco G. Antonio, on the ground that he is a Chinese citizen and therefore
disqualified to be a member of the Bar.
DIRECTOR VS BAYOT
Facts:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with
malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of
June 13, 1943,
Ruling:
Considering his plea for
leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decides that the respondent should be, as he hereby is,
reprimanded.
