INTRODUCTION
International Organization (IO) is in an extraordinary
period of transition. Organizations like the United Nations (UN), the
World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) play important and often controversial roles in the governance
of the international and domestic affairs of many societies. In this
academic paper, the researcher examine theory and practice of
international organizations, recognizing that international
organizations are part of a complex web of relations that can have
subnational, national, international and transnational ties. To trace
the pattern of this complex web, the researcher employs theoretical
framework – Realism – as a means of approaching the question on
the United Nations as a world government. Technically speaking, a
theory is a set of generalized principles that have descriptive,
explanatory, and predictive value (Bennett 1995, 5).
The
history of the organizations as a field of study suggests no clear
answer. The analytical shifts from “formal institutions” to
“institutional processes” to “organizational roles” to
“international regimes” have expanded the concept of
international organization to include almost any type of patterned,
repetitive behavior (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 753-775; Rochster
1986, 777-813). Traditionally, international organizations have been
conceived as formal institutions whose members are state. Such
organizations are called intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
because the government of nation-states voluntarily join, contribute
financing, and make decisions within organizations. IGOs are easily
identified because their purpose, structures, and decision-making
procedures are clearly spelled out in a charter or treaty. Example of
IGOs includes the UN.
All
IGOs have governmental as their formal members and can be further
categorized by rules of membership. IGOs may have universal
membership whereby all states are allowed to join. For example, all
states may become members of the UN, at least in principle. Chapter
II, Article 4 (1), states that UN membership is open to all
peace-loving states “which accept the obligations contained in the
present Charter, and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able
and willing to carry out these obligations.” State seeking UN
membership must petition of the UN Security Council, which then makes
a recommendation to the General Assembly. The General Assembly then
makes the final decision. While membership decisions can be quite
political, the UN has, for the most part, practiced an open-door
policy.
IGOs
may also have limited membership. Participation in IGOs is restricted
by some objective criteria. The Arab League, for example, is a
voluntary association of states whose people mainly speak Arabic.
This association seeks to strengthen Arab ties and promote common
political and economic goals. NATO, a security alliance, limits its
membership, restricting it by a combination of specific political,
geographic, and military considerations.
One
such actor is another kind of international organization, the
non-governmental organization (NGO). NGOs are essentially nonprofit,
private organizations that engage in a variety of international
activities. They can be oriented toward single issue or can have a
multipurpose agenda. NGOs participate in international politics
defining goals, providing information, and giving expert advice. They
also pressure governments and IGOs through direct and indirect
lobbying techniques. NGOs such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace,
and the International Committee for the Red Cross are instrument in
setting international norms and executing international policy. While
most NGOs receive some funding from the governments, their activities
can be autonomous and are often coordinated with IGOs.
Another
important kind of international organization is the multinational
cooperation (MNC). MNCs are for-profit firms that have subsidies in
two or more countries and engage in transnational production
activities involving the movement of goods and services across
national boundaries. IGOs, NGOs, and MNCs are the kinds of
international organizations that are examined extensively in regime
analysis. Regime analysis delves into the tangible principles and
rules that are codified in charters, treaties, and international law.
Informal principles, rules, norms, and decision-making procedures are
also examined even though they are not spelled out in any formal
sense. Regime analysis seeks to explain and model the complicated
nature of international relations in which multiple actors engage in
a variety of international and transnational activities. It seeks to
understand the very complex web of international relations that
invariably develops through any kind of international organization.
Hence
the term “international organization” may refer to many different
entities. IGOs (e.g., the UN), NGOs (e.g., Greenpeace), and MNCs
(e.g., General Electric) are types of international organizations.
International organizations also refer to the institutions,
processes, norms, laws, and regimes that consist of state and
nonstate actors. All this is part and parcel of global governance.
Global governance refers t the latest research into the study of
international organizations. Global governance focuses on how state
and nonstate actors define and address global problems absent a world
government. Global problems include war and other forms of violent
conflict, economic stability, poverty, disease, environmental
degradation, and human rights abuses. Global governance also involves
making and sustaining the rules and the norms of world order (Held
1999, 50). The “nature” of global governance, however, remains
contested.
In
this text, realism is used as mental map that help make sense of
contemporary international relations and international organizations.
Then the paper applies this theoretical approach to substantive issue
areas addressed by international organizations – security, trade,
development, and human rights.
Realism
Realist theory discusses which, as a worldview,
conceives of world politics as essentially conflictual. World
politics center on sovereign states seeking power and exercising
power against each other. States exist in a hostile and dangerous
world that forces them to be prepared for war and other forms of
violent conflict. This general worldview informs the realist
theoretical framework. For realists, the state is the principal unit
of analysis. While realists recognize that nonstate actors do exist,
nonstate actors are not as important as important because ultimately,
nonstate actors are responsible to the state or, at least, are
vulnerable to state action. Relations between states are
“international relations” for realists. Moreover, the state is
assumed to be a unitary rational actor, meaning that it behaves as if
it were a single entity capable of engaging in a cost-benefit
analysis when selecting courses of action or policy. The state seeks
to survive and maximize its national interest. International
relations are essentially conflictual. The darker side of human
nature and the constant threat of a attack guarantee that the
relations between states will be contentious.
The concept of anarchy is critical to an understanding
of the realist view of international relations. Anarchy is defined as
the absence of a higher authority or world government. The
international system is organized around sovereign states.
Sovereignty means that the state, or its representatives (the
government), has the final say within its territorial jurisdiction.
This means that in international relations no higher authority exists
above the state. This condition requires states to engage in
“self-help” in order to secure their security and other national
interests. International relations are essentially conflictual
because states, each pursuing a particular self-interest, often
collide with each other. This collision can very easily, and often
does, result in violence. With no world government, no referee exists
to settle disputes or prevent war. States, therefore, must seek power
because it is through power that states can maximize their interests
and guarantee their security under the condition of anarchy.
The realists’ emphasis on anarchy does not mean that
they see the international system as chaotic. On the contrary, they
point to the distribution of capabilities, or the balance of power,
as a source of order in the international system. While there is no
higher authority in international relations other than the state,
there is hierarchy of power. Through this hierarchy, realists explain
the creation international organizations and their role in
maintaining international order and cooperation. According to the
proponents of hegemonic stability theory, world order is established
by a single, dominant power that creates and administers
international organizations. These organizations serve the interests
of the hegemon and legitimize its dominant position. The hegemon will
maintain and support international organizations as long as the gains
outweigh the costs. Other states join these organizations even though
they serve the interests of the hegemon because the hegemon, through
its power, is able to provide positive incentives and inducements.
The hegemon also bears the costs of maintaining international
organizations. International organizations, therefore, are created by
and serve the interests of the dominant states. State will belong to
and use international organizations if it is in their interest to do
so. However, they will also ignore or even undermine them if that
interest is in their self-interest.
Order and stability in international relations are based
on a hegemon’s power. As that power declines, so do the world order
and the international organizations that provide the foundation.
Hence, most realists are very pessimistic about the independent role
of international organizations in fostering cooperation among the
sovereign states. Rather, it is the hegemon’s power reflected in
international organizations that facilitates international
cooperation. Realists tend to view international organizations as
extensions of the great powers or as great-power directorates. The
interest and behavior of international organizations must be
understood in the context of the interests of dominant states.
Conceptually, international organizations are IGOs, which are no more
than the sum of their member states. For realists, global governance
is a great-power concert facilitated by international organizations.
FIGURE
1: REALISM/NEOREALISM
REALISM/NEOREALISM
|
Key Actors
|
International System, States
|
View of the Individual
|
Power-seeking, Selfish, Antagonistic
|
View of the State
|
Seeks power; Unitary Actor; Has a
national interest
|
View of the international system
|
Anarchy; Stability in
balance-of-power system
|
Beliefs about change
|
Change potential is low; Structural
change is low
|
chapter
1: united nations
Historical
Antecedents
The
idea of international organizations has probably been around since
the advent of the first governments. From the writings of ancient
Greek philosophers, for example, we learn of military alliances and
international trading agreements. The Greek city-states Athens,
Sparta, and Macedonia once employed a common currency, which required
a high degree of international cooperation. Most contemporary
scholars, however, point to the Congress of Vienna (1815-1822) as the
earliest modern precedent to today’s IGO. The Congress of Vienna
was a forum for international collaboration on European security and
commerce. It also strengthened the Rhine Convention (1804), a
bilateral IGO between France and the German confederation. This
Commission established navigation rules for the Rhine River and an
adjudication board to prosecute individuals accused of violating
those rules. Similar river commissions were subsequently created for
the Danube and Elbe rivers in Central and Eastern Europe.
League
of Nations
The
first global IGO was the League of Nations (1919-1939), and it had
universal membership. The League, created after the World War I, was
recognized around three bodies: the Council, the Assembly, and the
Secretariat. The Council was the chief executive organ of the League.
It consisted of the victors of the World War I, together with any
four lesser powers that they chose to invite. The Council was mainly
responsible for addressing issues relating to international war and
threats to international peace. In addition, according to the
League’s Charter, the Council could “deal at its meetings with
any matter within the sphere of action of the League” (Article 4,
Section 4). The Assembly functioned as a quasi-legislative body; it,
too, was entitled to address any matter within the purview of the
League. All members of the League of Nations belonged to the
Assembly, and each member could have up to three representatives. The
Secretariat served as the League’s bureaucracy, which was
responsible for carrying out the League’s policies and mandates.
In
addition to the League’s three principal organs, several autonomous
and semiautonomous organizations were established under the League’s
Charter. The Permanent Court of International Justice and the
International Labor Organization (ILO) were created to help member
states meet their obligations under the League’s Charter. Article
13 committed members to submit any matter unsolved by diplomacy to
international arbitration or judicial settlement. The Permanent Court
of International Justice was established to consider disputes that
might arise regarding treaty interpretation or breaches of
international obligations assumed under international law. The ILO
was created, in part, to help member states meet their social
responsibilities. Article 23(a) stated that members of the League
“will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of
labor for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and
in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relation
extend, and for that purpose will established and maintain the
necessary international organizations.” The ILO, one of the few
surviving League institutions, remains the central IGO responsible
for setting and preserving international labor standards.
The
League of Nations, although widely considered a failed experiment,
was based on three important principles, which have since been
incorporated by its successor, the United Nations (UN). First, the
League of Nations embraced the idea of collective security where
international security is directly tied to the security of member
states. Second, the League established as a norm the peaceful
settlement of disputes through such nonviolent measure as mediation,
negotiation, arbitration, and adjudication. Third, the League was
founded to foster international cooperation in the economic and
social realms. The ideals of the League were both novel and
innovative. They were also heavily influenced by American values, as
one of the principal architects of the League was President Woodrow
Wilson. Ultimately, however, the U.S. government chose not to join
the organization – a decision that is widely considered to have
compromised the League’s effectiveness during the interwar period.
The League was politically challenged by the Japan-China conflict in
Manchuria (1931) and the Italy-Ethiopia conflict (1935). The outbreak
of World War II spelled the demise of the League as a viable
international organization. However, its legacy lives on.
United
Nations
The
UN system was created in 1945 following World War II. The founder of
the UN, meeting in San Francisco, sought to strengthen the idea of
the multipurpose, the universal IGO first envisioned by the League of
Nations. The UN was designed to be center of multilateral diplomacy
in postwar world politics. Its central purpose is manifold: to
maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly
relations among nations; to address economic, social, cultural, and
humanitarian problems; and to promote respect for universal human
rights. The UN retains the age-old principle of the sovereign
equality of all states; however, it also commits members to the
nonuse of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
FIGURE
2: PRINCIPAL ORGANS OF UNITED NATIONS
The UN is a comprehensive IGO to which, effectively, any
state can belong. The UN system is structured around six principal
organs – the General Assembly, the Security Council, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), the Secretariat, and the Trusteeship Council. These organs
serve as an umbrella to other UN agencies and autonomous bodies. The
six principal organs of the UN, together with its several agencies
and autonomous organizations, compromise the UN family of IGOs;
collectively, they address just about to every conceivable global
issue, including war, civil disorder, arms control, trade,
development, the environment, and human rights.
THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY The UN General Assembly
serves as a quasi-legislative, deliberative body. Its principal
functions, de jure functions are assigned by the UN Charter (Chapter
IV) and are fivefold. First, the General Assembly may deliberate and
consider any issue or questions that may rise under the Charter.
While its resolution are nonbinding, the General Assembly may address
issues that relate to the international peace, security, and
disarmament, and it may bring to the attention of the Security
Council any matter that may cause a breach of the peace. Second, it
is responsible for initiating studies and making recommendations for
promoting political cooperation and progressive development of
international law. Third, it is responsible for promoting
international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural,
educational and health care fields. Fourth, it is charged with
drafting and approving the UN budget. And fifth, it oversees the UN
bureaucracy.
The General Assembly is based on the liberal democratic
principles of political equality and maturity rule. It is a plenary
book, meaning that all member states may attend and fully participate
in General Assembly meetings. Originally, the General Assembly
consisted of 51 nation-states. Today, 193 states are represented.
Decisions are made on a one-state/one-vote basis, with a simple
majority deciding most issues. A qualified majority of two-thirds is
required for important questions, such as recommendations made with
respect to the maintenance of international peace and security or the
election of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council. The
General Assembly operates much like a congress or parliament,
although it does not produce binding law. Rather, the General
Assembly resolutions functions as an expression of general legal
principles, often forming the basis of the “hard” international
la, which is created through treaties. The General Assembly, through
its activities and its resolutions, best approximates the priorities
and sentiments of the “international community.”
THE SECURITY COUNCIL The UN
Security Council is the organ whose primary responsibility is
maintaining international peace and security. This task is quite
complicated because it involves in identifying threats to
international peace and security, crafting an appropriate
international response, building consensus, and carrying out
collective security actions. Unlike General Assembly resolutions,
Security Council decision are binding on member states, and member
are obligated to abide by and help carry out these decisions. It
should be noted that not all Security Council resolution are binding,
but only those in which a formal “decision” is issued.
The Security Council has limited membership. It is
composed of both permanent and nonpermanent, elective members and
headed by a president, an office that rotates among all members. The
permanent members include the five great-victors of the World War II,
while ten elected members are selected form and by the General
Assembly. Each of the Security Council’s permanent members
possesses an absolute veto over substantive Security Council
decision. This veto allows one member to kill Security Council
actions, and it cannot be overridden. Absent a veto, Security Council
resolutions are passed by an affirmative vote of nine members.
THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE The ICJ is
also known as the World Court and was created to be the principal
judicial organ of the UN. Incorporating much of the statute of the
League’s Permanent Court of International Justice, the ICJ has
semiautonomous status within the UN family. Chapter XIV of the UN
Charter authorizes the ICJ to adjudicate disputes arising under the
Charter and international law. The ICJ statute mandates that the
court consists of fifteen justices, no two of whom may be may be
nationals form the same state. The justices of the Court are elected
for nine-year, staggered terms by the General Assembly and the
Security Council through a complicated nomination and selection
process. These justices hear cases submitted to the Court by member
states and, and decision are reached through a majority vote. A
quorum of nine justices is required for the Court to hear a case;
however, the Court does not have compulsory jurisdiction over all
cases. Article 36 of the ICJ statute, often referred to as the
“Optional Clause,” allow parties to decide whether they want to
give the Court blanket jurisdiction over their current and future
international legal disputes. Very few states have given the Court
this kind of jurisdiction; thus, states usually consent to the
court’s jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. Access to the ICJ is
also limited to states. That is, only states may be parties in cases
before the court. Private individuals are barred from bringing cases
to the ICJ, and the court has refused to consider private petitions
and requests. All the states involved in a legal disputes must be
willing to have the ICJ hear the case before the Court will consider
the merits. As a result, the ICJ hears only one or two cases a year,
and it is generally considered an ineffective mechanism of
international adjudication. The ICJ remains “marginal to most of
the structural issues of international relations” (Forsythe 1998,
385).
The
ICJ can, however, influence world politics as it is also responsible
for providing advisory opinions on legal questions for the Security
Council or the General Assembly, upon their request. Other agencies
of the UN, when authorized by the General Assembly may also request
advisory opinions on any legal question that may rise in the scope or
course of their activities. The ICJ has issued advisory decisions for
a variety of UN agencies ranging from the ILO to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).
In 2003, the UN General Assembly (ES-10/14) requested an advisory
opinion on the legality of the separation barrier being built by
Israel in occupied Palestinian territories. The opinion, issued in
2004, held that the construction of wall violated international law
and the human rights of Palestinians living in the occupied
territories. This opinion generated considerable controversy as it
called into question a key element of Israeli security strategy and
complicated the “roadmap” to peace. Its effect also gave the
legal and moral high ground to opponents of the barrier and
strengthened the Palestinian’s bargaining position in any future
peace negotiations.
THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL The ECOSOC was
established under the UN Charter (Chapter X) to promote economic and
social cooperation among member states. It is actively involved in
the substantive issue areas of economic development, human rights,
and social welfare. The ECOSOC consists of fifty-four members elected
by the General Assembly for three-year, staggered terms. Each member
has one vote, and decisions are based on majority rule. Retiring
members are eligible for immediate election.
The
ECOSOC has several important functions and powers. First, it “may
make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international
economic, social, cultural, educational, and health and related
matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters
to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to
the specialized agencies concerned” (Article 62, Section 1).
Second, the ECOSOC may make recommendations for promoting and
protecting human rights. Third, the ECOSOC may prepare draft
conventions relating to economic and social issues. Finally, it may
call international conferences on matters falling within its
competence.
THE
TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL The Trusteeship Council
was created to oversee the transition of colonies into self-governing
territories. Its mandate is to ensure that the interests of the
inhabitants of these non-self-governing territories are placed at the
forefront of the decolonization process. Among the members of the
Trusteeship Council are UN member states that administer trust
territories. These members take an oath to respect the cultures of
the people involved and to respect their political, economic, and
social development. The Trusteeship Council also includes permanent
members of the Security Council that are not administering trust
territories. In addition, the Trusteeship Council is balanced; it
must consist of “as many other members elected to ensure that the
total number of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between
those Members of the United Nations which administer trust
territories and those which do not”. Decision making is based on a
one-member/one-vote, majority-rule arrangement.
The
Trusteeship Council, while pivotal in the 1960s, is largely obsolete
today. All the original UN trusts have become autonomous or
self-governing, and there is little left for the Trusteeship Council
to do. Its historical legacy is its over sight of the volatile
decolonization process, a process for which there have been as many
critics as champions. The Trusteeship Council’s role in this
process has been to debate and deliberate different strategies of
decolonization, as well as to monitor the effects of the process on
trust populations. It has also supervised the process by issuing
binding decisions on member states that were not permanent members of
the Security Council and making recommendations to those that were.
At the 2005 UN World Summit, the heads of the member states agreed to
wind up the business of the Trusteeship Council, reflecting the
completion of the role of the Trusteeship Council and the UN in
decolonization.
THE
SECRETARIAT The Secretariat serves as the UN
bureaucracy. It consists of the Secretary-General and the
bureaucratic staff necessary to carry out the UN’s complex task and
functions. The Secretary-General is the chief diplomat, whose task is
to present the UN to member states. The staff of the Secretariat is
supposed to be recruited on the basis of efficiency, competence,
integrity, and geographic diversity, although political patronage is
not unknown. The bureaucratic agencies of the Secretariat are created
by the General Assembly; however, both the ECOSOC and the Trusteeship
Council are explicitly assigned their own staffs. The size, expense,
and priorities of the UN bureaucracy are widely criticized today;
yet, most agree that some kind of bureaucracy is necessary to carry
out the large, complex tasks that characterized today’s global
issues.
Management
reform has been a high priority for the UN and its largest
contributors, the United Sates. Member states have agreed in
principle to strengthen the UN’s oversight capacity, especially in
relations to the Office of Internal Oversight Services and the new
Ethics Office. They have also agreed to overhaul policies relating to
budgets, finance, and staff to streamline UN activities. The United
States has demanded that the UN change the way it does business and
the scandals involving corruption relating to the “Oil-For-Food”
program and the procurement office accentuated the need to reform.
The specifics of these reforms are currently being fleshed out and
remain contentious at the UN.
The
Principles of the United Nations
The
United Nations is based on several complementary principles. First,
the UN is founded on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
members. This simply means that each state, at least in legal theory,
retains the right to determine its own internal and external affairs.
Second, UN members voluntarily accept responsibility to carry out
certain international obligations upon joining the UN, one of which
is to abide by Security Council decisions. The third founding
principle of the UN is the peaceful settlement of disputes. Fourth,
member states agree not to threaten or use force in their
international relations. Fifth, the UN is enjoined from the
intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of the member states. The
principle of sovereign equality, the peaceful settlements of
disputes, nonuse of force, and nonintervention are companion
principles critical to maintenance of international peace and
security.
The
UN Charter attempts to strengthen international peace and security by
permitting regional arrangements. Chapter VIII recognizes that
regional and local solutions to regional and local problems are often
preferable to UN attention. However, the UN Charter does require that
the UN be kept informed of regional activities and events that may
threaten international peace and security. Furthermore, the Charter
seeks to restrict regional enforcement activities by stating “no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council”
(Article 53). The architects of the Charter wanted to balance the
benefits of regionalism with the need for universal approaches to
international problems.
chapter
2: security
Security
means different things to different people. Traditionally, the
orthodox notion of security has centered on the security of the state
and the perennial problem of war. War has ended lives of hundreds of
millions of people and left once thriving societies in ruins. With
respect to the central issue of international security, then, it is
legitimate to ask how and international organizations respond to war
and threats of war. Diplomatic euphemisms aside, the causes of war
are numerous and intertwined. Societies fight to tangible reasons –
territory and resources. They also fight for intangible reasons –
ideology, nationalism, and religion. Yet the solutions to war are few
and frustratingly elusive. A true balance of power might deter
aggression; but if history is any indicator, a straight
balance-of-power approach is flawed and prone to failure.
The cause of war have become increasingly complicated
and its effects ruinous. Contemporary wars tend to have both internal
and external sources, and sophisticated weapons are readily available
to any party with money or credit enough to buy them. And though
fighting itself may be confined within states, its consequences are
felt elsewhere, often having international repercussions.
International organizations and member states attempt to manage the
ill effects of war and seek mechanisms that may prevent war in the
future.
In the past, international security generally meant the
security of states; however, many international organizations have
sought to reconceptualize security in terms of “human security”
(MacFarlane and Foong Khong 2006; Oberleitner 2005, 185-203; Ogata
and Cels 2003; Paris 2001; Peou 2002; Pettman 2005; Wedgewood 2002).
Human security is a people-centered approach that focuses on physical
threats to individuals. Such threats include not only war and other
violent conflict but also hunger, disease, environmental disaster, or
extreme poverty. Physical threats to individuals may emanate from
their government or from other groups within a society.
PERSIAN GULF CRISIS The idea
of collective security experienced a rebirth during the Iraq-Kuwait
of 1990. In August of that year, Iraq invaded Kuwait, quickly
occupying and annexing that tiny, oil-rich kingdom. Several factors
made this crisis unique among those generated since World War II.
First, the Iraq invasion was a textbook land grab, a kind of
aggression not witnessed since the World War II. The Korean War could
be interpreted as civil war or a war of national liberation. Other
invasion involving force has occurred, but they were for reasons
other than the occupation and annexation of territories legally
belonging to another sovereign state. In this case, however, the
Iraqi use of force clearly violated Article 2(4), the key UN
provision designed to thwart efforts to change territorial boundaries
by force. This kind of “naked” aggression occurred during a
period of transition in world politics. The USSR had national affairs
under Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. The warning of East-West
relations and the clear-cut nature of the Iraqi aggression enabled
the collective security arrangements of the UN to function in the
manner originally intended.
On the date of invasion, the UN Security Council met in
emergency session; it condemned the invasion as an unlawful use of
force and demanded an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces. Iraqi
forces quickly entrenched themselves in Kuwait, fortifying their
position along the Saudi Arabian border. The United States
immediately moved rapid-deployment combat forces into the region to
help defend Saudi Arabia and its strategic oil fields. The forces
deployed were not sufficient to repel an Iraqi onslaught, but they
did make the Iraqi leader think about the possibility of engaging
U.S. forces in combat. The United States informed the UN that it was
deploying its military in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter,
permitting the use of force for collective self-defense. Moreover,
both the Kuwaiti government and the Saudi Arabian government have
requested U.S. military assistance.
On August 6, 1990, the Security Council passed
Resolution 661 calling for mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq.
The sanctions were comprehensive although humanitarian and medical
supplies were exempted. The UN members, bound under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter to abide by Security Council decisions, were obligated
to honor this resolution. In the past, however, such economic
sanctions had not always been enforced; and in this case, supplies
and arms continued to flow to Iraq, especially from Jordan and
Turkey. On August 25, 1990, the Security Council authorized the use
of force if necessary to implement the economic sanctions-this, to
ensure the isolation of Iraq and to remind members of their UN
obligations. While the UN was applying diplomatic pressure on Iraq,
the United States was putting together a “multinational” force
dubbed Desert Shield. Although composed largely of U.S. army, air,
and naval forces, Desert Shield also included military units form the
Arab League, Great Britain, and France. On November 29, 1990, the
Security Council passed Resolution 678, authorizing “all means
necessary” to extract Iraq from Kuwait and setting a deadline of
January 15, 1991, for the Iraqi withdrawal. On January 16, 1991, the
Operation Desert Storm, a U.S.-led, UN-sanctioned military response,
was launched to force the Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The Iraqi
invasion was effectively reversed on March 16, 1991, when Iraq,
having been driven from Kuwaiti territory, agreed to a cease-fire.
THE REALIST PERSPECTIVE Recall
that realists tend to see international organizations like the UN as
tools or extension of great powers. They are usually created by a
hegemon or formed through the cooperation of great powers. According
to realist theory, international organizations either serve the
interest of the great power or are bypassed in favor of unilateral
action if great-power consensus cannot be reached. The Persian Gulf
Crisis exemplifies why power politics will always take precedence
over, and shape the actions of, international organizations. Realists
urge that Persian Gulf Crisis is a classic lesson in power
calculation and miscalculation.
For realists, the Persian Gulf Crisis was the
consequence of a very risky Iraqi gamble, one that Iraq lost and
continue to pay for today. Iraq has always been a strategic power in
the Middle East, playing a balancing role between the East and the
West during the Cold War. A virtual client of USSR and France, Iraq
has historically played a central role in the Middle Eastern
politics. As an oil producer and a long-time adversary of Iran,
Iraq’s strategic value was not lost either on the United States or
the USSR, both of whom provided arms and assistance to Iraq.
The mainstream U.S. media have largely interpreted
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as the folly of a madman. But, form a
strategic point of view; it was a gamble that could have paid off
handsomely for Iraq. Consider the decision to invade from Iraq’s
position. In the twentieth century, Iraq has been a second rate power
at best. First as a colony and then as an independent state, Iraq was
overshadowed commitments. Worse, Iraq’s devastating war of
attrition with Iran had drained its treasury and left its army
demoralized. Meantime, right next door was Kuwait, an unpopular
neighbor with impressive oil reserves, a lot of money, and no defense
worthy of the name. Many in the Arab world viewed Kuwait as an
arrogant puppet of the United States. During the Iran-Iraq war,
Kuwait had reflagged its oil tankers with the U.S. flag and
repeatedly exceeded its Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPEC quotas, lowering the price of oil in global markets. A
successful takeover of Kuwait would make Iraq the power in the Middle
East, controlling the largest standing army in the region together
with more than a third of the world’s oil supply. A quick military
action would present the world with a fait accompli, which few states
could do anything about. And once entrenched, Iraq could be extracted
from Kuwait only under very difficult conditions and at extreme cost.
The inly state capable of such a task was the United States, whose
forces in the region were negligible. By Saddam Hussein’s
calculations, then, a successful military action would raise Iraq to
great-power status with one quick relatively cost-free stroke.
But the UN, and particularly the Security Council, had
its own calculations. Its role and behavior can be explained by the
interests of the status quo great powers. The Security Council did
not ignore the Iraqi invasion; it reacted because it directly
threatened the interest of many of the permanent members. If Iraq’s
aggression were not reversed, there would be a permanent shift in the
balance of power in the Middle East, and perhaps the world. Iraq was
perceived as dangerous because its population was Muslim, its
nationalist leaders, and its agenda aggressive. Middle Eastern oil is
crucial to the military and economic security of world supplies was
an unacceptable risk as it could manipulate oil prices or impose a
boycott during times of conflict.
Mere dependence on oil is not sufficient reason for the
great powers to intervene militarily. Iraq was challenging the status
quo order. It challenges US leadership. US hegemony has depended, to
a large extent, on its ability to provide the world with access to
oil relatively low prices. Iraq threatened that ability. The shift in
the balance of power would destabilize the Middle East and weaken US
leadership capability. Hence, US interests were more directly engaged
than those of other powers dependent on Middle Eastern oil.
Realist sees international organizations as arenas that
reflect the existing balance of power (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). At
the time of the Gulf Crisis, the West, led by the United States, was
able to exercise its power within and outside of the UN, bringing
significant force to bear against Iraq. But despite the “global
community” and “new world order” rhetoric, the military actions
against Iraq were far from unanimous. Both France and the USSR were
reluctant to authorize military force and hesitate up to and perhaps
beyond, the January 15 deadline. They argued that the sanctions had
not enough time to work and that more time was needed to compel
Iraq’s withdrawal. Several nonpermanent members of the Security
Council, China, and Yemen either abstained or voted against economic
and/or military sanctions. Yemen was punished for its abstentions by
the United States., which cut off a planned aid package (Weston 1991,
524).
The Security Council could only authorize the use of
force; it had no military forces it could deploy itself. As long as
the UN must rely on the armed forces of member states, then only
member states that have a compelling interest are likely to volunteer
to participate in the enforcement action. Thus, in crisis situations
the UN response will always be politicized, reflecting the interest
and power calculations of leading member states. In other words,
either the UN will behave in a manner consistent with the interests
of the great powers, or it will be marginalized. If great-power
interests happen to be congruent, the UN can play a leading role
because it will represent those interests. But if great-power
interests conflict, the UN will be marginalized, and states will act
unilaterally or in concert with its allies.
The UN was just one of the many tools in the statesmen’s
toolbox. The UN provided legitimacy to the largest deployment and use
of force since World War II. Yet, it was the United States that
provided military capability, controlled the use of military, and
made all of the command decisions. Several observers have indicated
that UN approval ha enabled the United States to escape condemnation
for the excessive loss of Iraqi life and the destruction of Iraqi
infrastructures. The extensive levels of destruction, along with the
high civilian casualty rates, raise important questions as to whether
the UN response was proportional and whether all nonforcible means
had been exhausted before military force was applied (Gardam 1993;
Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 1994, 70; Weston 1991).
chapter 3: trade
One of the oldest and most controversial features of
international relations is trade – seemingly simple act of
exchanging goods and services between societies. On the one hand,
international trade yields mutual benefits: It increases the
diversity and quality of consumer goods and services, facilitates the
diffusion of technology, provides jobs, and promote efficiency. On
the other hand, trade can also destroy national industries, displace
workers, and threaten national culture and identity. Thus,
international trade has been, and continues to be, a force that
produces both cooperation and conflict between societies. The
controversies generated by trade make it one of the leading issues in
contemporary international affairs.
The World Trade Organization (WTO)
The difficulties in liberalizing the agriculture and
service sectors, together with the increasing use of NTBs, prompted
GATT members to form the WTO. The GATT was considered to be
inadequate for several reasons. First, the GATT was fundamentally a
provisional international agreement. When it became clear that the
ITO would never get off the ground, negotiators were forced to
develop ad hoc procedures for setting disputes. This made the dispute
process chaotic, complicated, and inconsistent. Second, the GATT’s
jurisdiction was quite limited. Technically, only tariffs and quotas
on manufactured and industrial goods fell under the purview of GATT.
However, with the globalization of production, the need for further
liberalization and the removal of NTBs increased in urgency. Third,
GATT as an organization had questionable legal status; it needed to
become both more impartial and more authoritative to tackle the
volatile issues of contemporary trade. Often deprecated as the
“General Agreement on Talk and Talk,” the GATT had no mechanisms
for authoritatively and systematically resolving disputes. Thus, as
the last order of business during the Uruguay Round, GATT members
voted the WTO into existence.
The WTO touts itself as a member-driven, consensus-based
IGO. That is, the WTO tries to reach decisions through decision. When
consensus is not possible, its voting procedures demand either a
two-thirds or three-fourths majority rule, each state having one
vote. The WTO is organized around four levels. At the top is the
Ministerial Conference, which is attended by all member states. The
Ministerial Conference, which is attended by all member states. The
Ministerial Conference must meet at least once every two years and is
responsible for the long-term strategic planning of the
organizations. While the WTO encourages consensus, four situations
are likely to trigger a vote of WTO members. First, a vote may be
required for interpretation of existing multilateral trade
agreements. Second, a vote may be necessary to waive an obligation
assumed under trading agreements. Third, amendments to existing
multilateral agreements require ministerial approval. Finally, the
admission of new members to the organization must be approved by WTO
members. Since its inception, no WTO decision or ruling has required
a vote of the Ministerial Conference.
The WTO is supported by a small bureaucracy (500 people)
called the Secretariat. The Secretariat leadership consists of the
Secretary Director General, staffed by trade experts and economists
who review the trade policy of members and provide the General
Council with expertise, training, and technical support. The
Secretariat, which provides the “expert panels” that adjudicate
unresolved disputes, is part and parcel of the appeal process. The
function of the Secretariat is to denationalize multilateral is
designed to take politics out of trade.
Depoliticizing and denationalizing trade is a formidable
task. Politics is about determining who gets what, when, how, and
why. Trade involves the global distribution of resources and wealth,
and governments are reluctant to practice protectionism for many,
interrelated reasons – reasons that may have little to do with
efficiency or comparative advantage. They may, for instance, seek to
protect certain industries or restrict trade in certain technologies
for or sophisticated war-fighting technologies are critical to a
state’s security.
The WTO faces an uncertain political and economic future
as trade talks have stalled and the international community is
experiencing an unprecedented and far-reaching global financial
crisis. The financial crisis, which began in the subprime mortgage
market in the United States, quickly spread around the world in part
because of the liberalization of the financial services that took
place under the auspices of the WTO. In 1997, the WTO and its member
states reached a historic financial agreement that would allow
multinational banks and insurance companies to operate globally and
in many emerging markets. The initial international response to the
WTO-sponsored agreement was mixed.
THE REALIST PERSPECTIVE Traditional
realists and economic nationalists see the WTO ruling as an
unacceptable erosion of state sovereignty. They fear that the WTO
will undermine governments, compromising their ability to regulate
the domestic economy. The capacity of WTO officials to review
government policies and declare them “impermissible” effectively
means that the WTO has the final say regarding policy and regulation.
This interpretation of WTO sovereignty over the U.S. government is
rather extreme; the United States can, in fact, withdraw fro, the WTO
or simply ignore its decisions. Criticisms of the WTO as a threat to
sovereign prerogatives make good press for conservative politicians,
but do not translate into any measurable loss of sovereignty. As
Clayton Yeutter, the trade representative during the Reagan
administration, said, “The sovereignty argument is pointless, for
every trade agreement we’ve signed in the past 200 years has in
some way infringed on our sovereignty” (cited in Crow 1996, 37).
In deciding to abide by the WTO ruling, the United
States made a shrewd political move. The WTO nullifies a law that
sets environmental standards too high for domestic and foreign
producers of gasoline alike. Meantime, the United States publicly
sacrifices its sovereignty for the “collective good”, thereby
setting the precedent for WTO authority internationally. The United
States gains additional suppliers of reformulated gasoline while
simultaneously strengthening the organization it has wanted to
create. A robust WTO is necessary to root out and eliminate trade
discrimination, the vast majority of which is against US products and
services (Buckley 1996, 70). Thus, the United States sacrifices
little and gains a lot. National government want organizations like
the WTO to support their policies, share the blame for unpopular
measures, and increase their access to markets and resources (Bayne
1997). The WTO decision in the Clean Air Act case fits the bill.
Since this case, the WTO has often ruled in favor of the United
States against some of its more intractable ruling against the EU in
an important computer networking case (Sanger 1998, C1). The WTO will
also be extremely useful to the United States in trade negotiations
with Japan (Lincoln 1997). For neorealists, the issue turns less on
sovereign and more on security. The United States can certainly
ignore any WTO decision that genuinely threatens its security – and
WTO officials know it. Therefore, they are not likely to issue any
such decision.
chapter 4: development
Development represents one of the principal challenges
of twenty-first-century international relations. Chronic poverty,
malnutrition, and disease characterized most of the developing world
and are creeping into segments of the developed world. Economic
stagnation and rampant inflation cripple economies, causing high
levels of debt, unemployment, and underemployment. The economic
disparities between rich and poor continue to widen at an accelerated
pace. The disparities between rich and poor are contributory causes
of war both within and between nations. In the view of many,
development is the best strategy for avoiding violent conflict and
averting political upheaval in the future. Unfortunately, no
consensus exists as to the causes of poverty or the meaning of
development. As a result, development issues remain controversial in
international forums.
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS Multilateral
approaches to the issue of development involve activities that extend
beyond the IMF and the World Bank. At the 2000 World Summit, the
members of the UN set ambitious development goals that require
extensive international cooperation among all UN members and
agencies. The MDGs blend both orthodox and critical approaches to
development and employ a more people-centered approach to
development. The interrelated goals are ambitious. The first goal is
to eradicate extreme poverty by halving the proportion of people
living on less than $1 a day and who suffer from hunger by 2015.
Success in reaching MDG 1 is conditioned on the success of MDG 2,
which is to provide universal primary education to both boys and
girls. MDG 3 is to promote gender equality for women, which involves
giving girls and women equal access to education at all levels. MDGs
4 and 5 center on reducing, by two-thirds, the child mortality rate
and improving maternal health care, respectively. The first five
goals need to be pursued simultaneously along with efforts to combat
AIDS and other infectious diseases-MDG 6. AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis are debilitating preventable diseases that have a direct
impact on the quality of life for millions of people. Prevention
requires education and improved status of women. MDGs 7 and 8 focus
on sustainable development and building a global partnership for
development. Each goal is accompanied by concrete measurable targets.
The ambitious goals set at the Millennium Summit reflect
the UN’s concern for meeting the basic human needs of the world’s
population by 2015. Economic development must go hand-in-hand with
human development in order for either to be successful. While a great
deal of consensus exists that these goals are both necessary and,
with proper attention, attainable, divisions remain on the
appropriate strategies. The 2005 World Summit illustrated some of the
disagreements surrounding how best to achieve the MDGs. Initially,
the United States sought to remove any mention of the MDGs from the
agenda in part because the MDGs involve international and
governmental interventions in the world economy; however,
international protest caused it to back down. President George W.
Bush included the MDGs in his speech to the General Assembly but
provided few specifics as to the role of the United States. Progress
toward specific targets has been slow; however, the largest creditor
nations did agree to forgive approximately $20 billion of debt owed
by the poorest nations in October 2005, demonstrating their
commitment to removing one of the principal obstacles to development.
Progress toward meeting the MDGs by 2015 has not been
altogether promising. The UN Human Development Report (2005, 8)
states the following:
The
MDG target for reducing child mortality will be missed with margin
equivalent to more than 4.4 million avoidable deaths in 2015. Over
the next 10 years, the cumulative gap between the target and the
current trends adds more than 41 million children who will die
before their fifth birthday from the most readily curable disease –
poverty. This is an outcome that is difficult to square with the
Millennium Declaration’s pledge to protect the world’s children.
The
gap between the MDG target for halving poverty and the projected
outcomes is equivalent to an additional 380 million people in
developing countries living on less than 1$ a day by 2015.
The
MDG target of universal primary education will be missed with 47
million children in developing countries still out of school in
2015.
The MDG initiative has met with some success in large
part because of the progress of China in terms of poverty
alleviation, primary education, and gender equality. Its double digit
economic growth and increases in international trade have improved
the lives of millions of Chinese and have had a significant impact on
MDG statistics. However, sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia
have actually gotten worse.
In 2008, rising fuel and food prices exacerbated the
living and working conditions of the poor around the world. With the
accompanying inflation, those living in poverty and extreme poverty
faced difficulty meeting subsistence nutritional needs. The global
financial crisis has meant that wealthy states are less generous in
their ODA. Since 2005, ODA has declined and, with the financial
instability in the advanced industrialized countries threatening to
take down the global financial system, increases in ODA are not
likely. The global financial crisis is unprecedented on several
levels, and the turmoil is reshaping the nature of financial
regulation and international development.
THE REALIST PERSPECTIVE As
an international initiative, the MDG strategy is well-intentioned but
insignificantly is measured by the extent that states, which comprise
international community, are willing to devote their scarce
resources. While absolute cost of meeting all of the MDGs remains in
disputes, this international community has largely agreed that if the
richest countries in the world would devote 0.7 percent of their
gross national income, then the international community could
eliminate extreme poverty globally. That is, the world’s richest
states need only devote $0.70 of every $100.00 they earn to
development in order to lift the rest of the world out of extreme
poverty. To date, only a few countries such as Norway, Sweden,
Luxembourg, Denmark, and the Netherlands have met this benchmark.
That so few states are willing to commit what seems to be such an
insignificant amount demonstrates that alleviating extreme poverty
around the world is not a particularly high priority for states.
From a realist perspective, international aid actually
does more harm than good (Easterly 2006). UN efforts at developing
and attempting to fulfill the MDG are laudable, but such grand plans
usually fail. International institutions are inefficient and too
removed to effectively administer a grand plan. Infusion of resources
leads to corruption and mismanagement at the UN and for aid recipient
states. States seeking to assist others in meeting the MDGs would do
well to devote aid bilaterally to insure proper management.
chapter 5: human rights
International organizations play crucial roles relating
to human rights and humanitarian issues. IGOs like the UN, EU, and
the Arab League promote human rights and deliver emergency assistance
to societies in crisis. NGOs work with IGOs to provide food aid and
health, education, and legal services. Human crises are intertwined
with political violence, environment degradation, and gross
violations of human rights.
RWANDA In April 1994, the
tiny country of Rwanda took a disastrous turn toward genocide that
would claim more than 800,000 lives in mere 100 days. The victims
were members of the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus who were
murdered with machetes and small arms in just a few weeks. The
perpetrators of the genocide were roaming gangs of the ethnic
majority Hutus consisting mostly of men; however, large numbers of
women and children also took part in the carnage.
The genocide killing began on April 6 after the airplane
carrying Rwanda Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundi
President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down by a surface-to-air
missile on its approach into Rwanda capital, Kigali. The two leaders
had been attending a peace conference that was geared toward building
a lasting peace in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. This
region has experienced wide-scale political unrest and violence, most
of which stemmed from the ethnic conflict between Tutsis and Hutus.
In 1993, the UN Security Council created and deployed a small,
lightly armed peacekeeping force called the UN Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNAMIR’s mandate was to help implement the
cease-fire between the Hutu government and Tutsi rebels as part of
the Arusha Peace Agreement. UNAMIR’s 2,500 blue helmets represented
the international community’s commitment to the peace process and
consisted of troops from Belgium, Ghana, and Pakistan. Within hours
after the downing of President Habyarimana’s plane, the Rwanda
presidential guard began hunting down the Tutsi and Hutu opponents of
the president and killing them. On April 7, Rwanda’s first female
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana (and Habyarimana critic) was
raped and murdered. The ten Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect
her were tortured, brutalized, and killed.
Hutu government insiders informed the UNAMIR commander
that Hutu extremists intended to kill all the Tutsis. UNAMIR
commanders wanted to move quickly to seize weapons that had been
stockpiled, but were told by the then head of UN peacekeeping Kofi
Annan that weapons seizures would not be supported and that UNAMIR
was not to take any action without further authorization. In the
meantime, Hutu gangs were on the move, committing mass murder of the
Tutsi minority. Rwanda radio incited the violence by directing
killers to where Tutsis minority. Rwanda radio incited the violence
by directing killers to where Tutsis were hiding and filing the
airwaves with hateful propaganda. More moderate leaders were
murdered, as UN peacekeepers stepped aside. Thousands of Tutsis,
fleeing the machetes, went to UN camps for protection.
The Tutsi rebel force, known as the Rwanda Patriotic
Front (RPF), launched an offensive to seize power and stop killing.
The approaching Tutsi force caused hundreds of thousands of Hutus to
flee Kigali, the Rwanda capital. The mass movements of Tutsis and
Hutus created a humanitarian disaster in the border regions,
especially in Tanzania. The UNHCR and the WFP struggled to avoid
famine and disease. Several Western countries also sent special
forces to Rwanda. The Tutsi employees of the Western embassies were
not evacuated even though they faced certain death. On April 22, the
UN Secretary-General recommended that the UN Security Council either
beef up and heavily arm UNAMIR or withdraw the peacekeepers from
harm’s way. The Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR to a token
presence of 270 people. As the UN withdrew from Rwanda, Hutu
extremists overran the camps and slaughtered the inhabitants.
By July, Kigali fell to the RPF and over one million
Hutus fled to neighboring countries. A new coalition government was
formed with Tutsis prominently represented. The genocide was
effectively ended. In November, the UN Security Council announced the
creation of an international criminal tribunal to try the Rwanda
“war” criminal. In November 1996, he UNAMIR mission was
officially concluded.
THE REALIST PERSPECTIVE The
end of the Cold War effectively signaled the demise of the great
powers’ engagement of the Great Lakes Region and their interest in
Africa in general. During the Cold War, the outcomes of political and
ethnic conflicts in the region were of strategic importance to the
superpowers in their ideological and territorial battle. The United
States, European states, and the former Soviet Union meddled in
Africa wars of independence, each trying to influence events in their
favor. The end of the Cold War greatly diminished the strategic
importance of Africa, and the African states were left to themselves
to solve their political and ethnic conflict that had been inflamed
and exacerbated by years of Cold War tension. In short, by 1994 the
great powers had no compelling national interests in Rwanda.
Unfortunately for the Rwandans massacred in the
genocide, the UN’s first post-Cold War foray into Africa was a
disaster for US armed forces. The US-led UN intervention into Somalia
in 1992 was to deliver humanitarian food and medical aid to millions
of Somalis at risk. Once that mission was accomplished, US forces
began the difficult task of state-building by trying to create a
coalition government among hostile warlords. US forces had to track
down renegade warlords and attempt to disarm exceptionally well-armed
militias. Nineteen US “peacekeepers” were brutally killed, and
their bodies were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the
capital of Somalia. The US peacekeepers were on the same kind of
mission that UNAMIR initially requested to undertake in Rwanda as the
genocide began to unfold. With that experience, the United States was
reluctant to expand UNAMIR’s mission because it would likely have
involved a commitment of US troops in another remote region of
Africa. As a result, UNAMIR wad denied the authorization to take
decisive steps to seize the weapons that could have at least stalled
the genocide. The United States had a policy not to intervene in
Rwanda and, therefore, the UN did not intervene (Forsythe 2000, 15).
US Department officials were instructed not to use the word
“genocide” even though it was clear to officials that the
genocide was occurring (Frontline 1999).
Rwanda even had a nonpermanent seat on the Security Council, but no
one asked the Rwanda representative to explain what was happening or
even to assure Security Council members that the activities merely
amounted to a “breach of the peace.” Neither the United States
nor the UN would use the word “genocide” because genocide demands
a response and the United States was committed to nonintervention
(Lewis 2001, A5).
conclusion
Realists predict continuity, both in international
relations and in the nature of global governance. States remain the
principal and most important actors in international relations, and
international organizations are subordinate to the dominant powers of
the day. The international system will still be defined as anarchy
characterized by some kind of balance of power. International
organizations will continue to play secondary roles in the management
of international affairs. War, violence, and conflict will remain at
the forefront of the international stage. What will change, according
to realists, is the distribution of capabilities among states. There
is nothing inevitable about the world order created under US
hegemony. The values, norms, and rules regarding state behavior in
the year 2025 will be decided by the powerful. The behavior and
interests of IGOs will reflect that underlying balance of power.
If the UN remains a viable organization, collective
security will continue to be a politically motivated and power-driven
endeavor. Collective security will be triggered only when the
geostrategic, military, and economic interests of all the great
powers are engaged and those interests are congruent. A congruence of
great-power interests will be just as difficult to achieve, if not
more so, in 2025 as it was during the twentieth century. Liberal
principles of justice and international law will not prompt UN
action, rather only great-power interests. Whether or not the UN will
continue to exist will be determined in large part by the answers to
two questions:
Can
war between the great powers be avoided? The historical record
suggests that war is an inevitable part of international relations.
States that want peace must always be prepared for war. Nuclear
weapons may create a particular kind of balance of power that
renders war between the great powers obsolete, but that is no
guarantee against devastating terrorist attacks. War remains a
likely possibility, particularly if the current international order
experiences a crisis or some kind of breakdown. A global depression
or a regional conflict that spins out of control could erode US
leadership capabilities to the extent that a revisionist challenger
will seek to change the system. The United States could fight or
abandon its leadership role. A new world leader, possibly China, may
create international organization that institutionalize its dominant
role and legitimize its leadership position. The UN may meet the
same fate as the League of Nations, finding itself on the trash heap
of failed experiments. Even if global war can be averted, the United
States or some other state (or a group of states) must be willing to
commit the resources necessary to keep the UN operating. Chances are
that great-power indecision and neglect will marginalize the UN.
Can
the UN adapt to the changing power distributions among states? If
nuclear weapons generate an effective stalemate among the great
powers, then the UN must change to reflect the shifting
distributions of conventional military and economic capabilities.
The original composition of the Security Council reflected the
balance of power after World War II. However, after the Cold War,
the permanent members of the Security Council have resisted reforms
that would include rising states and states from the developing
world on the Council. The permanent members have rejected any change
in the veto provision or other substantive decision-making
procedures. The Security Council will likely remain a great-power
concert in that the members will balance each other but will permit
the great powers to intervene militarily in their own spheres of
influence. The great-power cooperation that occurred during the
1990s was more an aberration than the birth of true collective
security.
The Security Council will be just as paralyzed as it
always has been. The optimism of the 1990s quickly eroded as its
collective security initiatives in Somalia and Rwanda proved
disastrous. The sobering conflicts of interest and power realities
have prevented effective collective security. As an institutional
framework, collective security does little to curb unilateral uses of
force by the permanent members. These states will continue to use
violence to secure their national interests, which include forcibly
changing the governments of other states and carrying out military
reprisals. The proliferation of nuclear weapons will create multiple
“cold wars” as adversaries stand off. The Security Council will
like remain paralyzed, unable to act.
The nature of conflict in the twenty-first century does
not lend itself to traditional collective security of the kind
envisioned by the UN architects after World War II. Collective
security in the twentieth century was designed to guard against the
traditional landgrab and the territorial expansion of states through
force. International conflict in the twenty-first century has
internal sources and is low in intensity but prolonged. Terrorism is
also a persistent threat. International conflict occurs in the
marginalized areas of the world, where the permanent members have few
interests. Marginalized states have disintegrated along ethnic and
religious lines. Only strong states continue to survive internal and
external challenges. International security between strong states
will be achieved through a balance of power.
IGOs that relate to trade will meet the same fate as
security IGOs. The WTO, which is based on free trade principles, will
be effectively only as long as the major powers stand to benefit from
free trade. States will ignore any WTO decisions that go against
their important national interests. And they will abandon free trade
if they begin to lose significant national wealth. States will erect
barriers to trade in order to arrest their decline or to maximize
economic advantages. States that engage in managed and strategic
trade will take advantage of those that pursue free-trade policy.
Economic development in the Third World is likely to
undergo a crisis. Developing countries realize that the nature of
economic relations is, in many respects, a zero-sum game, and they
are on the short end of the stick. Developing states need to take
responsibility for their own national development and not rely on
foreign capital and foreign assistance. Economic development in the
Third World has been arrested by ballooning external debt and
currency crises. Free flows of capital have created speculative
bubbles that can burst, taking entire economies with them.
The protection, promotion, and enforcement of the human
rights remain in the realm of low politics in the twenty-first
century. States will remain appalled by gross violations of human
rights in other countries, but they are not likely to intervene
unless significant national interests are at stake. Hence,
international enforcement of human rights is a politically motivated
endeavor - a noble mask for the not-so-noble interest of the
intervening states.
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