Define realpolitik and describe how this principle is evident in the strategies of Otto Von Bismarck and Camillo di Cavour.
The term politics is used in many
ways in everyday language, often with a negative implication of self-interest,
backstabbing, and trickery, such as in the phrase “office politics.” This
characterization is not completely unfair; even in the government, politics
often involve such intrigue. But one need not think of politics only as a
negative endeavor. In fact, despite the common joke that word comes from “poly”
(meaning many) and “ticks” (blood-sucking insects), politics is an essential
activity for any sizeable group of people. As Aristotle put it in The Politics, “Man is a political
animal.” Without cooperation and an ability to enforce the rules established to
govern behavior, large groups would be subject to chaos and the will of the
strongest to a much greater extent than happens in modern societies.
Realpolitik is defined as a set of
activities that help organize individuals, systematically resolve disputes, and
maintain order in society with the use of power. These actions include passing
and enforcing laws governing individual behavior, mobilizing and channeling
mass participation, and socializing individuals to support the political system
and the values on which it is based. If politics involves “who gets what, when,
and how,” then when and how people get what they want depends to a large extent
on their power.
Realpolitik refers to politics or
diplomacy based primarily on power and on practical and material factors and
considerations. It is a power as influence and a power as capabilities. Power is
influence: getting people to do what you
want them to do. The concept of power as influence includes the idea that
one person in a power relationship can overcome the resistance of another.
Power is capabilities that focus on the characteristics that would give one the
ability to influence important outcomes.
Also, realpolitik is characterized
with both coercive and noncoercive power. Coercive power is getting what one
wants through the use of rewards and punishments. In domestic politics,
government leaders can pass laws that prohibit certain actions and come up with
punishments for those who break the law. On the other hand, noncoercive power
is getting what one wants because of legitimacy. Noncoercive power rests on a
different foundation, one that does not involve rewards and punishments. In
this case, power results from a sense of legitimacy.
The principle of realpolitik is
evident in the strategies of Otto von
Bismarck and Camillo di Cavour.
It is the strategy of influence and capabilities of coercive and noncoercive
power.
Otto
von Bismarck
World War I brought the world's
major nations into the war at one time or another. It's the alliance
system was as much at fault as anything in bringing about the scale of the
conflict. It's possible to
delve deeply into European history in the quest to unearth the roots of the
various alliances that were at play in 1914. However, for our purposes it
serves to date the origins of the core alliances back to Bismarck's renowned intrigues, as he
set about creating a unified Germany from the loose assembly of German
confederated states in the 1860s. The German statesman Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck
(1815-1898) was largely responsible for the creation of the German Empire in
1871. A leading diplomat of the late 19th century, he was known as the Iron
Chancellor. Bismarck, first Prime
Minister of Prussia and then Chancellor of the German Empire (once he had
assembled it), set about the construction of Germany through high politics
judiciously assisted by war against Austria and France.
Strategically, Otto von Bismarck
engineered war with Austria in 1866 over disputed territory in the duchy of
Holstein as the first step to oust Austria as the prime influence among these
German states in order to achieve the creation of the German Empire. The
resulting war lasted just seven weeks which its common title “The Seven Weeks
War” and ended with the complete dominance of the supremely efficient Prussian
military. Bismarck extracted Austria not only Schleswig and Holstein, but also
Hanover, Hesse, Nassau and Frankfurt, creating the North German Federation.
Having assembled a united assembly in the north Bismarck determined to achieve
the same in the south – and so unite all of the German states under the
Prussian banner. Bismarck resolved that war with the French, a common enemy,
would attain his aims. First, he needed to engineer a credible reason for war
by a doctored version of a telegram ostensibly from the Kaiser to Bismarck
himself, called the Ems Telegram that affected both insult France and Prussia
over their inability to resolve the dispute over the Spanish throne.
Napoleon III, facing civil
revolt at home over quite unrelated matters, and receiving encouraging noises
from his military commanders, responded by declaring war against Prussia five
days later, on 19 July 1870. Once again, as was the case against Austria, the
Prussian military machine demolished the French forces. The consequences of the
war were numerous. Aside from the usual territorial gains – France ceded both
Alsace and Lorraine to Prussia and was forces to pay swingeing reparations –
the southern German states agreed to an alliance with their northern
counterparts, resulting in the creation of Bismarck’s cherished German Empire.
Bismarck did not initially fear an alliance between France and Britain, for the
latter was at that time in the midst of a self-declared 1870s policy of
“splendid isolation”, choosing to stay above continental European politics.
For, having achieved his life’s
aim, Bismarck’s expansionary plans were at an end. He had secured what he wanted,
and his chief desire now was to maintain its stability. He therefore set about
building European alliances aimed at protecting Germany from potentially
threatening quarters. He negotiated in 1873 with the Three Emperors League which tied Germany, Austria-Hungary and
Russia to each other’s aid in time of war. However Russia withdrew five years
later in 1878 leaving Bismarck with a new Dual
Alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1879.
This latter treaty promised aid
to each other in the event of an attack by Russia, or if Russia aided another
power at war with either Germany or Austria-Hungary. Should either nation be
attacked by another power, e.g. France, they were to remain – at the very least
– benevolently neutral. This alliance, unlike others, endured until war in
1914. It was this clause that Austria-Hungary invoked in calling Germany to her
aid against Russian support for Serbia (who in turn was protected by treaty
with Russia).
Two years after Germany and
Austria-Hungary concluded their agreement, Italy was brought into the fold with
the signing of the Triple Alliance in
1881. Under the provisions of this treaty, Germany and Austria-Hungary promised
to assist Italy if she were attacked by France, and vice versa: Italy was bound
to lend aid to Germany or Austria-Hungary if France declared war against
either.
Potentially of greater
importance, Bismarck in 1887 agreed to a so-called Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. This document stated that both
would remain if either were involved in a war with a third (be it offensive or
defensive). However, should that third power transpire to be France, Russia
would not obliged to provide assistance to Germany (as was the case of Germany
found itself at war with Austria-Hungary).
The realpolitik of Otto von
Bismarck is narrowed down to power and alliance. By all means, he uses his
legitimacy to engineer war against Austria as the first step to have the German
Empire. In order to secure the power held by the German Empire, Bismarck
strategically called for alliance not only to avoid war but to preserve the
power of the German Empire. He allied with the Austria-Hungary with the Dual
Alliance and also with the Triple Alliance with Italy to avoid war in the
south. One of the chief aims of the Triple Alliance was to prevent Italy from
declaring war against Austria-Hungary, towards whom the Italians were in
dispute territorial matters. Also he negotiated Reinsurance Treaty with Russia
to avoid the possibility of the two-front war against France and Russia. Realpolitik
as being defined above is indeed a set of activities that help organize
individuals, systematically resolve disputes, and maintain order in society
with the use of power may it coercive or noncoercive.
Count
Cavour,
as he’s often known, was the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Piedmont and
Sardinia. He was largely responsible for creating the nation of Italy. He
forged an alliance with France which meant that his kingdom got Lombardy as a
reward for fighting along with the French against the Austrians. Then Garibaldi
went into Sicily and overthrew the King of Naples. Because he was a radical and
republican Cavour moved quickly to “welcome” the liberated lands into what he
now called the Kingdom of Italy.
Strategically, the realpolitik
of Camillo di Cavour was the same that of Otto von Bismarck which deals with
power politics and alliance. Camillo di Cavour did his best to used Piedmont as
the key to the unification of Italy same as Bismarck’s Prussia as the key to
the unification of the German Empire. Camillo di Cavour accepted the alliance
with Britain and France in order support Piedmont’s expansion in Italy.
Attempted assassination of
Napoleon III brought strong bond between Cavour and Napoleon III. Cavour
reluctantly agreed to cede Savoy and Nice to France and also arranged a royal
marriage between Princess Clotide and Prince Napoleon to aid Piedmont by
France.
On the other hand, Garibaldi was
military dictator of southern Italy and Sicily, and he imposed the Piedmontese
constitution but publicly demanded that Cavour be removed, which alienated him
slightly from Victor Emmanuel.
Garibaldi was
unwilling to stop at this point, and planned an immediate invasion of the Papal States. Cavour feared France in that case would declare war to
defend the Pope, and would successfully stop Garibaldi from initiating his
attack. Garibaldi had been weakened by the Battle of Volturno, so Cavour quickly invaded the Papal regions of Umbria and
the Marches. This linked the territories conquered by Piedmont with
those taken by Garibaldi. The King met Garibaldi halfway at Naples, where
Garibaldi handed over control of southern Italy and Sicily, thus uniting Italy.
In 1861,
Victor Emmanuel II declared the Kingdom of Italy, making Cavour officially
prime minister of Italy. In this case, Count Cavour strategically used France
to protect not only Piedmont but to attain the unification of Italy.
Realpolitik
is power and alliance.
